Introduction
Why do some countries have constitutional environmental rights while others do not? In this essay I conduct survival analysis using a Cox regression model on UNrecognized countries over the time period 1983-2010 in order to respond to this inquiry.
The analysis proceeds as follows: (1) I review relevant literature and describe theories which may explain state behavior regarding the adoption of constitutional environmental rights; (2) I conduct statistical tests on six independent variables-International Civil Society Influence, Regional Diffusion, Human Rights Legacy, Natural Resource Dependency, Monetary Incentives, and Level of Democracy-to determine which factors offer the greatest explanatory value for the phenomenon observed; and (3) I summarize results of the analysis and offer conclusions. I argue that norm socialization and transnational activism offer more explanatory purchase than domestic politics and rationalist-materialist considerations in understanding the trend toward constitutionalization of environmental rights. I find that the enactment of constitutional environmental rights is most significantly associated with International Civil Society
Influence and a country's Level of Democracy, and best explained by theories based on norm socialization and transnational activism.
Theoretical Background
Four bodies of literature inform the analysis of constitutional environmental rights-environmental rights, constitutional design, human rights, and international norms. Literature on environmental rights consists mainly of normative legal arguments in favor of expanding human rights to include environmental rights and case study analyses that chronicle the development of environmental rights provisions in constitutions throughout the world (i.e. Brandl & Bungert, 1992; Bruch, Coker, & VanArsdale, 2001; Gormley, 1990; Hodkova, 1991; May & Daly, 2009; Osofsky, 2005; Sax, 1990; Shelton, 1991; Thorme, 1991) . Scholarship on constitutional design entails empirical studies that describe the trend in global constitutionalism and provide descriptive accounts of the constitution-making process in post-colonial and postcommunist states (i.e. Brown, 2003; Elster, 1995; Ghai & Galli, 2006; Go, 2003; Ludwikowski, 1993; Osiatynski, 2003) . Recent work on human rights focuses on why states sign international human rights treaties and how ratification affects state human rights performance and the impact of constitutional human rights provisions (i.e. Goodman & Jinks, 2003; Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui, 2005; Hathaway, 2002; Hathaway, 2007; Heyns & Viljoen, 2001; Keith, 2002; Lutz & Sikkink, 2000; Neumayer, 2005) .
Finally, scholars of international norms have suggested that the domestic and international legal contexts in which states operate facilitate the adoption of international norms (i.e. Boyle et. al. 2002 , Dommen, 1998 Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Lutz & Sikkink, 2001; May, 2006; Sandholtz, 2008; Simmons, 2000) . However, none of the bodies of literature described above offer an explanation for the global expansion of constitutional environmental rights.
What theories might explain why countries adopt environmental rights? Current social science scholarship on the subject is sparse, and those researchers who do discuss the phenomenon do so without additional empirical probing. Many authors recognize the emergence of a trend toward legalization of environmental rights but fail to attribute its existence to anything other than growing international concern for environmental issues since the 1960s (i.e. Bándi 1992 , Ebeku 2007 , Popović 1996 , Shelton 1991 . Therefore, in this section I develop alternative explanations for the adoption of environmental rights.
First, a theory of norm socialization, based on world society theory and a constructivist approach to international relations, may explain why certain states adopt environmental rights. On this question, world society theory (Meyer et al. 1997 ) is instructive and comports with the constructivist approach to international relations.
World society theorists argue that structural similarities at the national level are due at least in part to the widespread influence of a dynamic global culture. In this theory, states are "exogenously constructed entities" created by and constantly redefined through interactions with actors at all levels of governance in international society (Meyer et al. 1997, 150 ). Yet, while states may act and be reconstructed in response to the behavior of actors such as other states, transnational activists, and intergovernmental organizations, this redefinition is more the result of being entrenched within a broader world culture as opposed to internal rational calculation. In world society theory, it is world culture that shapes and constrains states. Similarly, constructivists claim that "the actions of states contribute to making the institutions and norms of international life, and these institutions and norms contribute to defining, socializing, and influencing states" (Hurd 2008, 304) .
States both act upon international society and are constituted by it, becoming socialized to desire certain things in the process (Finnemore 1996, 2) . Unlike rationalists, constructivist scholars argue that the formation of an identity occurs prior to the formulation of interests. 1 Identities are "relatively stable, role-specific understandings and expectations about self" (Wendt 1992, 397) . These understandings and expectations, socially constructed through a framework of discourse, inform interests that actors pursue. Therefore, world society theorists and constructivists might speculate that a country would be socialized through interactions in international society to adopt environmental rights as a "symbol of national identity and democratic commitment" (Ackerman 1997, 783) .
Second, a rationalist-materialist account of international relations may provide an explanation for the phenomenon of interest. Rationalists argue that "norms [are] reflections of fixed preferences of the most powerful states" (Florini 1996, 366) . For example, rationalists might argue that states adopt environmental rights as a result of coercion, pressure, or incentives offered by a hegemon (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990) .
Another rationalist explanation for the phenomenon may be that a state wishes to send a signal to potential investors about the strength of the rule of law in the country in order to secure foreign direct investment. Empirical research has demonstrated that government respect for physical integrity rights and political rights and civil liberties increases as the level of foreign direct investment in a country grows (Richards et al. 2001, 219) . One scholar explains the causal linkages inherent to this line of thought:
"Because rights operate as trumps over normal governmental interests, they have an inherent cost. Consequently, by entrenching protection for human rights, governments can signal a willingness to give up power in the short term to obtain long-term benefits. Investors can infer from this that the government has a low discount rate and is less likely to pose a threat of expropriation. Similarly, when courts vigorously enforce human rights, they dramatize their judicial independence, which is valuable to investors, who themselves may have no interest in human rights. Thus, human rights enforcement may help encourage investment and thereby indirectly foster economic growth" (Farber 2002, 83) .
Similarly, states may enact certain rights to appease donor countries seeking to offer financial support to countries that take measures to promote the protection of human rights. For example, previous work has shown that the distribution of U.S. foreign aid is positively associated with a recipient country's efforts to safeguard human rights (Abrams & Lewis 1993, 819) . In the present study, environmental rights, which are often classified as third-generation human rights, may be viewed as elements of the broader human rights initiative undertaken by a country to solicit support in the form of aid or investment. A related but opposite argument, that firms looking to invest abroad flock to so-called "pollution havens" where environmental regulations are weak or non-existent, is generally not supported by empirical studies on the topic (Petrović-Randjelović 2007, 188; Zarsky 1999, 47) . Therefore, under a rationalist-materialist explanation states might adopt environmental rights to satisfy the demands of a hegemon, fall in line with other countries in the region to avoid appearing like a laggard and thus losing a competitive edge in attracting investment, or pursue self-interested goals such as increasing foreign assistance.
Third, a theory based on transnational activism may help to describe why states adopt environmental rights. Mainly, transnational advocacy networks may play a central role in raising consciousness about environmental injustice within a state, and promoting institutional changes to address the problem. Transnational advocacy networks "are networks of activists, distinguishable largely by the centrality of principled ideas or values in motivating their formation" (Keck and Sikkink 1999, 89) , that engage in the exchange of information and services centered around advancing a particular cause.
Transnational advocacy networks may effect change proactively by drawing attention to an issue currently unattended to by decision makers and demanding action, or reactively by compelling compliance with legal obligations already adopted but not adequately implemented and enforced. The latter of these approaches is referred to as the "paradox of empty promises" (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005), whereby a state may ratify human rights treaties with no intention of enforcing them only to find that members of global civil society ultimately pressure the government to comply with their legal obligations to protect human rights. In short, a theory of transnational activism suggests that borderless advocacy groups leverage resources that would otherwise be unavailable to domestic groups in order to promote the protection of environmental rights.
Fourth, a theory focused on domestic politics may assist in answering the main research question. For champions of domestic politics, the legalization of environmental rights might be a function of public opinion on environmental issues among the citizenry of a state (Calvert 1979) , the efforts of domestic social movement organizations (Rucht 1999, 215) , the policy decisions of governmental leadership, or a combination of these factors (see Agnone 2007) . Pressure to adopt environmental rights may come from a range of actors within a state who seek to right historic wrongs or improve the quality of the natural environment. These actors may utilize a variety of tactics, such as protests, letter writing campaigns, lobbying, litigation, or voting to encourage domestic leaders to address the issue of environmental justice through the enactment of environmental rights.
2 Indeed, several of these theories may necessarily overlap. For instance, norm socialization may function simultaneously with a rationalist-materialist rationale (Simmons 2000) ; transnational activism may promote the legalization of international norms through socialization (Risse and Sikkink 1999, 5) ; transnational advocacy networks may provide resources to assist domestic pressure groups (Keck and Sikkink 1999, 89) ; domestic interest groups may operate under rationalist-materialist considerations (Olson 1965) ; and international norms may be invoked by domestic groups (Cardenas 2004, 215) . Therefore, throughout this research it will be important to consider the potential interaction between possible theoretical explanations for the adoption of environmental rights, and the likelihood that any resulting explanation may be complex and multi-level.
Due to resource constraints inherent among countries that elect to instantiate these rights, the flexibility, specialization, and network capacity of transnational advocacy groups, and the relative lack of importance afforded to environmental rights compared to more substantial institutional innovations and reforms desired by donor countries, I argue that norm socialization and transnational activism offer more explanatory purchase than domestic politics and rationalist-materialist considerations in understanding the trend toward constitutionalization of environmental rights.
2 The preceding analysis is not meant to foreclose on the possible importance of an interactive approach to answering the research question. Indeed, some scholars find explanatory purchase in analyzing the dynamism between the domestic and international levels of governance. Writers in this tradition view state policymaking as the outcome of a "two-level game" in which international norms are translated through domestic structures (see Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 893; Florini 1996, 379) . For these theorists, decisions regarding the adoption environmental rights may be the result of simultaneous pressure from a domestic public and a donor state attaching purse strings to certain democratic reforms.
Research Design

Hypotheses
In this research project, I test the efficacy of domestic politics, norm socialization, rationalism-materialism, and transnational activism explanations for the phenomenon of interest. Specifically, I hypothesize the following:
The greater the number of international civil society organizations to which citizens are a party, the more likely a state will be to adopt environmental rights
The greater percentage of other countries in the region with environmental rights, the more likely it is that a country will adopt environmental rights
The poorer a country's human rights legacy, the more likely it is to adopt environmental rights
The greater a country's reliance on natural resources for its economic productivity, the less likely it is to adopt environmental rights H 5 : The more external financial support a country receives, the more likely it is to adopt environmental rights.
H 6 : The more democratic a country is, the more likely it is to adopt constitutional environmental rights. H 2 is rooted in the notion that countries within the same geographic region will tend toward isomorphism with regard to legal commitments due to socialization and policy transfer (Dolowitz and Marsh 2000) or possibly in order to avoid appearing like laggards and enhance their reputation to compete intra-regionally for investment (Simmons 2000, 832) . Countries writing new constitutions often borrow certain design elements from a limited number of exemplars 4 and many of the same people (i.e. foreign constitutional law scholars) who helped write one new constitution within a region may be called upon to assist another country within the same geographic area. In addition, especially in the developing world, decision makers in one region who participate in the creation of a new constitution may have all received the same special training from regional or international bodies working to promote democracy and development.
Relatedly, countries within a given region may solicit expertise and technical advice from members of an epistemic community during the constitution drafting process. An epistemic community refers to "a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue area" (Haas 1992, 3) . Alternately, states may simply copy the provisions contained within the constitution of another country from within the region so that they do not appear to lack contemporary human rights laws that would make them seem less committed to the rule of law and thus riskier prospects for foreign investment.
H 3 is suggested by the observation that countries with a history of insufficient protection of human rights, especially former communist states in Eastern Europe, are more likely to adopt individual rights guarantees as a way to correct for the inadequate protection of such rights under the rule of previous governments (Osiatynski 1994, 112) .
In this way, the adoption of new human rights functions as a signal to the domestic polity that the state is dedicated to repairing relations with its citizenry, preventing backsliding from occurring, and promoting democratization through the enactment of progressive policies.
H 4 is predicated on the idea that a country that is highly dependent upon natural resources for its economic productivity will be less likely to develop strong governing institutions (Barbier 2005) . Such countries may shy away from promulgating legal commitments that could be used to hamper the exploitation of natural resources in the event economic development results in environmental degradation which causes human rights to be violated.
H 5 is based on the empirical finding that countries dependent on external financial assistance will adopt certain institutional reforms, such as codifying environmental rights, to satisfy the demands of donor countries desiring to see such reforms implemented (Alesina and Dollar 2000, 33) . More precisely, the adoption of a constitutional environmental right may in fact be epiphenomenal to the implementation of institutional reforms required under the terms of an aid package. In addition, countries may adopt environmental rights in order to appear committed to the protection of human rights and transparent for the purpose of attracting foreign investment (Law 2008, 46-48 n142, 50) .
H 6 relates to the argument that "democracies as a whole…are more likely to join human rights treaties" (Hathaway 2007, 613) . In particular, Hathaway (2007) contends that democracies are more likely to contain constituencies which favor the adoption of human rights treaties, enabling leaders in such countries to reap collateral benefits from participating in international human rights instruments. Collateral benefits may include, for example, the attainment of certain policy goals that might be difficult to achieve otherwise. It may also be the case that the obligations stipulated in human rights treaties hold normative value for states which privilege restrictions on government authority.
More broadly, the protection of human rights is considered an important element of good governance, and good governance remains strongly associated with democracy (Reif 2000, 18) . Therefore, analogizing human rights treaties to constitutional environmental rights, countries which tend toward greater levels of democracy may be more inclined to entrench such rights in their respective governing charters.
A table summarizing the aforementioned hypotheses and the theories to which they apply is provided below (Table 1) . model is semi-parametric in that the model is based on the assumption of proportional hazards, although no particular form of probability distribution is assumed for the survival times (Collett 2003, 56) . The Cox model is particularly well suited to handle multivariate regression with dichotomous outcomes and time-dependent variables, which makes it an ideal statistical technique for this project. Using this model I analyzed the variation in the times-to-event across countries for measures of the five independent variables described earlier. The formula for the full Cox model used in this analysis is as follows:
where i refers to the country, and t signifies a time-dependent variable.
Analysis
The aforementioned hypotheses will either be confirmed or disconfirmed based on the regression coefficients and hazard ratios realized through analysis of the data using the Cox model. For H 1 , a positive coefficient for the ICSI variable will indicate that the greater the presence of INGOs in a country, the more likely it is to adopt environmental rights. For H 2 , a positive coefficient for the RD variable will suggest that the greater the percentage of countries within a given region with environmental rights, the more likely a country will be to adopt environmental rights of its own. The hazard ratio for the RD variable will instruct that with every increase of 1% in the percentage of countries with a constitutional environmental right the estimated likelihood of a another country adopting a constitutional environmental right is either increased or reduced by a certain percentage. For H 3 , a negative coefficient on either measure of the HRL variable would indicate that countries are less likely to establish environmental rights if they have a positive human rights record, and thus more likely to do so the worse their human rights record. For H 4 , a negative coefficient on either measure of the NRD variable would support the idea that the greater a country's dependency on natural resources for its economic productivity, the less inclined the country is to adopt a constitutional environmental right. For H 5 , a positive coefficient produced for any of the three measures of the MI variable will suggest that the greater a country's reliance on external financial support, the more likely the country will be to adopt environmental rights. For H 6 , a positive coefficient for the RC measure would indicate that the more democratic a country is, the more likely it is to adopt a constitutional environmental right during a given year. The hazard ratio for the Level of Democracy variable will offer the insight that with every additional point in a country's Polity IV score (i.e. a country tends more toward democracy than autocracy), the likelihood that a country may enact a constitutional environmental right is either enhanced or diminished.
Model Selection
Due to the utilization of different sources of data in this study and the unique features of each dataset, two distinct approaches to model selection were employed in the analysis in order to test variables of theoretical importance while also managing data issues such as missingness. 10 First, I conducted an analysis oriented toward maximizing the number of cases included. This necessarily entailed removing those measures and variables that suffered from severe missingness, which I determined to mean a condition where greater than 5% of the data was absent. All variables (with the exception of Regional Diffusion) were initially treated with extrapolation in order to fill in missing values of the data, but those measures for which the number of missing data exceeded 5%
were selected for exclusion from the model. The employment of this strategy resulted in the removal of four measures featured in the full model. 11 Next, I used backward elimination to remove additional measures that failed to achieve statistical significance at the .05 level. This procedure resulted in the elimination of six additional measures. This approach to model selection allowed me to retain 148 total cases, 62 of the original 75 cases in which constitutional environmental rights were adopted, and five statistically significant variables.
Second, because it was necessary to test the full model, I conducted another analysis focused on maximizing the number of variables to be tested. Again, all measures were subjected to extrapolation prior to the removal of any cases. This process required the deletion of cases that suffered from severe missingness, construed here as a situation in which a case lacked data for 50% or more of the years under observation on any given measure. Upon completing the removal of cases with severe missingness, 12 the data set was comprised of 113 total cases, 45 of the original 75 cases in which constitutional environmental rights were adopted, and all 15 measures in the full model.
Next, in order to construct the most robust statistical model, I followed the fourstep model selection procedure advocated by Collett (2003, 80-83) . In the first step, I ran a Cox model regression for each of the 15 measures independently. In the second step, I
retained only those measures that produced both statistically significant results and a loglikelihood value one-unit or more greater than the log-likelihood for the null model. Then I computed the change in the value of the log-likelihood for the tested model when I omitted, one at a time, each of the previously retained measures. In the third step, I
reintroduced, one by one, each of the measures I had discarded at the beginning of step two to observe whether bringing back any of these measures produced a one-unit or greater reduction in the log-likelihood of the tested model. Three such measures, each statistically significant at the .10 level, were identified. 13 In the fourth step, I conducted a final model check by running Cox model regressions on three models, each of which 12 The removal of certain measures due to missingness was a function of variable endogeneity since most developed countries did not receive any kind of foreign financial assistance. This fact resulted in the elimination of most European countries from the data set, for example. Therefore, the maximum-variable model necessarily contains far fewer developed countries than does the maximum-case model. 13 Collett (2003) The two model selection methods described above were employed in order to balance the competing interests of case maximization and variable maximization. As will be discussed below, the two strategies produced mostly consistent results, thus allowing for greater confidence in the validity of the conclusions subsequently drawn from the analysis.
Results
For the maximum-case model, five measures-Civil Liberties, GDP per capita, International Civil Society Influence, Population Density, and Regime Characteristicswere found to produce a statistically significant effect on the likelihood that a country will adopt a constitutional environmental right. 14 The statistical output from this model is included below (see Table 2 ). The hazard ratio for Civil Liberties suggests that with every one-unit increase in a country's civil liberties score, the likelihood that a country will entrench a constitutional environmental right in its governing charter increases by 38%. The hazard ratio for GDP per capita signifies that with an increase of $100 in a country's GDP per capita, the likelihood that the country will adopt a constitutional environmental right decreases by 1%. The hazard ratio for International Civil Society Influence suggests that for every 100
INGOs with a membership presence in a country, the likelihood that a state enacts a constitutional environmental right increases by 8%. The hazard ratio for Population Density indicates that with the addition of 100 people per square mile, the likelihood that a country promulgates a constitutional environmental right decreases by 53%. Finally, the hazard ratio for Regime Characteristics purports that for every one-unit increase in a country's Polity IV score (i.e. a country tends more toward democracy than autocracy), the likelihood that such a country will instantiate a solidarity environmental right in its constitution increases by 16%. In the maximum-case model, countries that scored 3 or higher on the Polity IV scale were 128% more likely to enact a constitutional environmental right than countries that scored below 3. This result suggests that developing countries in the process of democratization may be the most likely group of states to institutionalize the protection of broadly articulated environmental rights.
For the maximum-variable model, while the model with the greatest loglikelihood included seven measures, only four of the measures-GDP per capita, Net
Bilateral Aid, Population Density, and Regime Characteristics-were found to be statistically significant at the .05 level. 16 The results of the analysis for this model are depicted below (see Table 3 ). The hazard ratio for GDP per capita indicates that with an increase of $100 in a country's GDP per capita in a given year, the likelihood that the country will adopt a constitutional environmental right decreases by 2%. The hazard ratio for Net Bilateral Aid, while statistically significant, is not empirically informative because the statistic suggests that the effect of the measure is virtually nonexistent. 18 The hazard ratio for Population Density signifies that with the addition of 100 people per square mile, the likelihood that a country enacts a constitutional environmental right decreases by 48%. Finally, the hazard ratio for Regime Characteristics demonstrates that for every one-unit increase in a country's Polity IV score, the likelihood that a country will incorporate an environmental rights provision into its constitution increases by 10%. In addition, countries that scored -2 or above were 184% more likely to entrench a solidarity environmental right in their constitution. It is important to note that despite the use of all variables and measures for which data was collected and included in the initial version of this model, the fact that this model was analyzed using 24% fewer total cases and 27% fewer cases in which 16 The three measures not included in the final model were Foreign Direct Investment (z = -1.48), International Civil Society Influence (z = 1.64), and Political Rights (z = 1.56). 17 For the full statistical output for the maximum-variable model, see Appendix B. 18 Indeed, the standard error of the Net Bilateral Aid measure was 5.24e-11 and the 95% confidence interval was (1, 1).
constitutional environmental rights were enacted than the maximum-case model likely reduced the overall model skill by a non-trivial amount.
Upon completion of the analysis, I completed diagnostic tests on both the maximum-case and maximum-variable models to establish whether or not the major assumption underlying the Cox model-that of proportional hazards-had been violated. 19 In particular, I conducted two kinds of tests: (1) visual assessments of graphic plots and (2) Chi-square tests comparing model output with the Schoenfeld residuals of the data. To develop plots for both models, the median values for each of the measures were calculated and dummy variables were created to separate observations above (coded "1") and below (coded "0") the median. Then each measure was plotted in three ways:
(1) separately using the dummy variable in a log-log plot; (2) adjusted for the presence of the other statistically significant measures in a dummy variable log-log plot; and (3) separately in a survivor plot. For the maximum-case model, the plots did not show evidence that the proportional hazards assumption had been violated. Similarly, for the maximum-variable model, a visual inspection of the plots failed to reveal any obvious departures from the proportional hazards assumption.
The results of the Chi-square tests are presented below (see Table 4 ). meaning that there is a 1% probability that deviation from the expected values is due to chance alone. Therefore, it is likely, given the data for the ICSI variable, that the observed differences in hazard rates are not due to chance alone.
Discussion
The results of the statistical analysis with respect to the hypotheses enumerated earlier are summarized below (see Table 5 ). First, the analysis suggests that the greater the international civil society influence present in a country, the more likely it is to adopt a constitutional environmental right. Second, the percentage of countries within a region that have constitutional environmental rights did not have a statistically significant impact on the likelihood that another country would enact a constitutional environmental right in either of the models tested. 20 Third, in accordance with expectations, I found that the worse a country's human rights record in terms of its protection of civil liberties, the more likely it is to promulgate a solidarity environmental right in its constitution. Fourth, the extent to which a country is dependent upon natural resources for its economic vitality was not found to be significantly related to the propensity of a country to include a solidarity environmental right in its governing charter. Fifth, the relationship between a country's reliance on foreign financial assistance and the likelihood that it will adopt a constitutional environmental right was ultimately deemed to be inconclusive since only one measure of the Monetary Incentives variable proved to be statistically significant and its hazard ratio did not indicate a positive or negative effect on the outcome of interest. Sixth, in congruence with the final hypothesis, the results of the analysis suggest that the more democratic a country is, the more likely it is to adopt a constitutional environmental right during a given year.
The statistical analysis conducted in this study provides the greatest support for the norm socialization and transnational activism explanations for the trend toward constitutionalization of environmental rights beginning in the 1970s. Moderate support was also found for the domestic politics explanation (see Table 6 for full results). 20 When analyzing the Regional Diffusion variable on a regional scale by testing the hypothesis in the three regions of the world in which constitutional environmental rights are most prevalent, Gellers (2012) found that the percentage of countries within a region with constitutional environmental rights actually had a statistically significant negative effect on the likelihood of further adoption of such rights. In addition to examining the variables of interest, several control variables were tested as well. Of those controls included in the analysis, GDPpc and PD were found to be statistically significant. Specifically, countries with a lower GDP per capita and lower population densities were more likely to adopt constitutional environmental rights. These results suggest that constitutional environmental rights are more common among less crowded developing countries.
Countries that have yet to adopt constitutional environmental rights may be reticent to do so for at least two reasons. First, rather than being laggards, these countries may have positioned themselves to simply "wait and see" the effects of including these kinds of provisions in constitutions. This perspective may be founded on the premise that it is best to observe how these situations played out in other states before promulgating an environmental rights provision in one's home constitution. Some countries may wait in order to observe the experience of those states with constitutional environmental rights (i.e. number of cases filed, number of issues resolved, costs of litigation, etc.) before deciding to enact such a right. As the data is right-censored, more countries may adopt constitutional environmental rights in a new constitution or as an amendment to the existing constitution in the near future. 
Conclusion
This study is designed to help explain the trend toward constitutionalization of environmental rights. In particular, I conducted a statistical analysis to determine the extent to which five independent variables provide a suitable explanation for the proliferation of constitutions featuring environmental rights since the mid-1970s. Using a
Cox model for analyzing survival data, I found that International Civil Society Influence and Level of Democracy both had a statistically significant positive relationship to the phenomenon observed. Further research on the topic would benefit by conducting qualitative case study analyses to gain additional analytical leverage regarding causal mechanisms which led to the adoption or neglect of these rights, improving the coverage and quality of data used to operationalize relevant theoretical perspectives, and testing new variables, such as the adoption of international treaties or judicial independence, which may offer greater explanatory value than the ones analyzed here. As environmental concerns continue to increase in importance and the dynamic international legal context continues to influence the form and content of governing charters throughout the world, the study of environmental rights will remain a compelling area of research for the foreseeable future. 
